Predtetchinski, Arkadi (1979-)

A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game / A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Heringsschema:ProductModel Incomplete contracts and the core / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Incomplete contracts and the core / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining : a revision / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining with a general voting rule / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining with a general voting rule / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining with unanimity rule / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel The fuzzy core and the (π, β)-balanced core / Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy / A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings, H. Petersschema:ProductModel The weak sequential core for two-period economies / Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrés Pereaschema:ProductModel The weak sequential core for two-period economies / Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrés Pereaschema:ProductModel

A folk theorem for bargaining games / P.J.J. Herings, A. Meshalkin, A. Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Bargaining with non-convexities / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Best response cycles in perfect information games / P.J.J. Herings, A. Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Doing it now, later, or never / Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Equilibrium delay and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games / Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Limits to arbitrage when market participation is restricted / Thorsten Hens, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskiischema:ProductModel Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric nash bargaining solution / Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel On the convergence to the nash bargaining solution for endogenous bargaining protocols / Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core / Nizar Allouch, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Procedurally fair income taxation schemes / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Procedurally fair taxation / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Sequential share bargaining / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining / P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Theory of the firm : bargaining and competitive equilibrium / Volker Britz, Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel Voting in collective stopping games / P.Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinskischema:ProductModel