Bolt, Wilko (1968-)

Credible threats in negotiations : a game-theoretic approach / by Harold Houba and Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel Holdouts induce lower wage increases if new contracts are backdated / Harold Houba, Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations / H. Houba and W. Boltschema:ProductModel

A first mover disadvantage and a non-feasible threat point in strategic bargaining / Wilko Bolt, Harold Houbaschema:ProductModel A note on extreme equilibria in bargaining games / Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel Banking competition, risk, and regulation / W. Bolt and A.F. Tiemanschema:ProductModel Corporate governance in the Netherlands / W. Bolt and M. Peetersschema:ProductModel Fiscal restraints, ECB credibility and the Stability Pact : a game-theoretic perspective / W. Boltschema:ProductModel Inefficient equilibria in a bargaining model with different time preferences / Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel Output gap and inflation in the EU / W. Bolt and P.J.A. van Elsschema:ProductModel Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game / W. Bolt and H. Houbaschema:ProductModel Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game / Wilko Bolt, Harold Houbaschema:ProductModel Theory of negotiation : a game-theoretic approach / Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel Wage bargaining in the Fernandez and Glazer model: a comment / Wilko Boltschema:ProductModel