Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard / Thomas Ziesemer
Ook verschenen als online resource
| rdfs:label | "Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard / Thomas Ziesemer" |
| schema:name | "Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard" |
| schema:author | Ziesemer, T.H.W. (1953-) |
| Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology | |
| schema:contributor | International Institute of Infonomics |
| schema:description | "Ook verschenen als online resource" |
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<http:/ |
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schema:main |
<https:/ |
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http:/ |
"2001" |
| schema:about |
<http:/ |
| productie | |
| Renewal | |
| Risicobeheersing | |
| werkgelegenheid | |
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schema:is |
MERIT-Infonomics research memorandum series |
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schema:number |
15 |
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